NASA Study Summary: "Alternatives for Future US Space Launch Capabilities"

[luke strawwalker]

Here's a study completed by the Congressional Budget Office (CBO) from October 2006. It outlines some of the alternative vehicles considered around the time of the Ares I/ Ares V 's adoption by NASA as their preferred vehicles for meeting the requirements of the Vision for Space Exploration, what would come to be known as "Project Constellation", which was ultimately canceled in 2010/11.

Here's the summary and the pics will follow... Enjoy! OL JR

[luke strawwalker]

Existing and historical heavy lifters...

Characteristics chart...

"Closely derived" launchers as defined by the study...

Cost comparison of "closely derived" vehicles...

"Super Heavy" (as defined by the study) launchers and their evolution from existing vehicles...

Later! OL JR

[luke strawwalker]

Comparison of "super heavies" considered in the study...

Cargo launches required of various launchers considered and total payload capability...

Costs of "close derivative" launchers...

Shuttle modifications into "close derivatives" of shuttle...

Atlas modifications into its "close derivatives"...

later! OL JR

[luke strawwalker]

Modifications to create Delta IV "close derivatives"...

Mods to create shuttle derived "super heavies"...

Mods to create Atlas "super heavies"...

Mods to create Delta "super heavies"...

Comparison chart of recurring costs (per flight) of various launchers...

Later! OL JR

[luke strawwalker]

Comparison chart of costs of all alternatives examined, 2006-2017...


This was an interesting study from a historical perspective in 2012, knowing what we know now. Ares I, which was projected to cost $5 billion to develop (to first flight) had burned through $9 billion (along with Orion) from 2006-2010 when it was canceled, and hadn't even completed PDR, meaning it wasn't even off the drawing board. The five segment first stage SRM development was well along and continued to completion (so far) but the J-2X wasn't even in the testing phase when the Ares I was canceled and the upper stage and other vehicle systems were in the design phase. The Ares I IOC, originally to be 2014, had slipped to 2017 (20% confidence level) or more realistically, 2018 (75% confidence level, IIRC). There's no reason to put any more faith in any of NASA's estimates for the final costs for Ares V, either.

The "cost comparisons" between shuttle, Delta IV, Atlas V, and Saturn V REALLY are the smoking gun here... note shuttle costs per pound of payload to orbit... they're STUPID expensive! Compare it to Saturn V, which, despite having a MUCH larger development cost (due to being at the bleeding edge of "state of the art" in the mid-60's and having to invent "everything"!) actually had a per-pound payload cost to orbit about the same as Delta IV and Atlas V, themselves only a FRACTION of shuttle costs! It's safe to say that, had Saturn V been flown enough to amortize the development costs over more units produced, and had it been "improved" through a cost-cutting program to streamline and simplify the manufacturing and integration of the vehicle, it could have beat the pants off any other system flying today, and ESPECIALLY off the shuttle!

What a shame...

Note also the shuttle costs per launch-- CBO estimates them at about $900 million per flight. Now, NASA always cried foul at this estimate as too high, and claimed that shuttle per-flight recurring costs were around $450 million to $500 million per flight. Now that shuttle has been retired and the final program costs are known (to the degree they can EVER be fully known, since NASA often plays games in the bookkeeping, assigning project costs to other projects when they're in a budgetary crunch and one project runs into cost overruns or needs extra funding, muddying the waters as to what the projects ACTUALLY costs). The shuttle program, from its inception in 1972 until the last orbiter flew, with retirement costs, divided by the 135 launches in the program, works out to a cost of about $1.1 to $1.2 billion per flight... MUCH closer to the CBO estimate of $900 million per flight than the "official" NASA estimate of $450 million or so... (a figure roughly arrived at by dividing shuttle program budget by the number of flights per year).

IOW, shuttle was a "bill of goods" from day one...

Later! OL JR

[blackshire]

Thank you for posting these new documents! They confirm a conviction of mine that has been growing for some time: NASA should be razed, destroyed, smashed to bits. In its place should be created a new organization--NACA, the National Advisory Committee for Aerospace, which would be essentially a rebirth of the pre-NASA NACA (National Advisory Committee for Aeronautics). Also:

Just as the old NACA did *not* constitute a "national aviation program" (it was not a government aircraft procurement & air transportation service that competed with the private aviation industry), the new NACA would -not- be--as NASA is--a "national airline to space" that (by its very existence) is an impediment to the development of a competitive private space industry. Like the old NACA, the new NACA would conduct high-risk/high-reward, cutting-edge Research & Development work on aircraft, launch vehicle, and spacecraft structures, propulsion systems, guidance systems, materials, and aerothermodynamics--the kind of research that is too expensive for private aerospece firms to conduct entirely on their own. In addition:

The existing NASA (formerly old NACA) field centers would conduct this work as they did under the old NACA--unlike NASA, the new NACA would do its R & D work exclusively to provide such engineering knowledge to private industry--the new NACA would *not* develop or operate space transportation systems, although scientific satellites and unmanned space probes (which have no immediate, direct commercial applications) would be part of the new NACA's mission--as they were part of the old NACA's mission.

[luke strawwalker]

I agree, NASA needs a MAJOR reboot...

Not entirely sure of the best way to do it, though...

Of course as a political animal that proves quite useful to a number of constituencies, I SEVERELY doubt it will ever happen (along with campaign finance reform, term limits, and Congress actually having to live under the same laws they force upon us).

No less an esteemed person than Apollo 17's Harrison "Jack" Schmitt agrees with us... he's on the record saying NASA needs a complete reboot.

Later! OL JR :)

[tbzep]

I agree, NASA needs a MAJOR reboot...

Not entirely sure of the best way to do it, though...


The congress via NASA has wasted billions and billions over the years by authorizing and funding programs, then cancelling them before anything was accomplished.

The first thing that congress and NASA need to do is make a decision on what they really want to accomplish and stick with it. Heck...just pick something worthwhile and go!!! At the very minimum, I'd like us to go back to the moon before the Chinese, if for no reason other than to tick everybody else off that we can start from scratch twice before anybody else can get there once!

Second, they need to fund it and lock it in place so that no future congress or administration can cancel it.

Third, congress must allow NASA to find the appropriate compromise between fastest, cheapest, safest way to accomplish that goal without demanding that certain technologies be used only because they are built in their state.

I don't think any of those three things will ever come to pass, so I predict that in my lifetime I will only see the continued cycle of starting programs and canceling them before they bear fruit. :mad:

[foamy]

snip... Like the old NACA, the new NACA would conduct high-risk/high-reward, cutting-edge Research & Development work on aircraft, launch vehicle, and spacecraft structures, propulsion systems, guidance systems, materials, and aerothermodynamics--the kind of research that is too expensive for private aerospece firms to conduct entirely on their own. In addition:

The existing NASA (formerly old NACA) field centers would conduct this work as they did under the old NACA--unlike NASA, the new NACA would do its R & D work exclusively to provide such engineering knowledge to private industry--the new NACA would *not* develop or operate space transportation systems, although scientific satellites and unmanned space probes (which have no immediate, direct commercial applications) would be part of the new NACA's mission--as they were part of the old NACA's mission.

They have done and they still do all of that.

What NASA needs is a real mission. A Moon base is the logical step.

[blackshire]

They have done and they still do all of that.That isn't the point (or the problem with NASA). The NACA never competed with private industry. NASA, by being a de facto "state-run airline to space," could and did undercut private space launch companies, particularly the small ones (their subsidies for launching satellites aboard the Shuttle were just one example of this) because being a federal agency, it doesn't have to worry about making a profit or even being efficient. Also:

The large, legacy launch vehicle manufacturers (Boeing, General Dynamics, Lockheed, Martin Marietta, McDonnell Douglas, Rockwell, etc.) were Shuttle contractors and also produced other products (missiles and their components) for the government, so they weren't concerned about reducing the cost of space access because their customers who paid them (NASA and the DoD) didn't care, either. This distortion of the market has kept us dependent on incrementally-improved derivatives of 1950s-era ballistic missiles, which were developed back then with only rapidity of readiness and reliability in mind--their cost was not considered important.What NASA needs is a real mission. A Moon base is the logical step.I agree, but NASA should not be the sole agency involved because of their myopic vision and because spreading out the cost among other federal agencies (and other nations) would make such a base more affordable (including to NASA). In the U.S., the National Science Foundation and the U.S. Geological Survey, as well as the Department of Energy (their nuclear and solar energy expertise would be valuable) should have shares in such a lunar base. ESA, JAXA, and the European & Japanese scientific agencies that operate the European and Japanese Antarctic bases would also be helpful partners in establishing, operating, and expanding a Moon base.

[luke strawwalker]

A REAL mission with REAL timelines would be a good start, but there's A LOT more to it than that...

Tbzep's post was SPOT ON! Couldn't agree more myself.

Personally I think NASA's biggest problem is that it's become a government bureacracy-- it's too top heavy with big industry hacks and politicos moving back and forth through the revolving door, and too full of up-n-coming management types looking to get on the gravy train rolling through the revolving door between industry, academia, and the halls of political power and position, and who are willing to sell their souls (to the detriment of the goal, program, and country) in the process... NASA is "too big" and too top heavy.

It's become only too subservient and too happy to be a political football, and plays that game to its advantage. The "contractors" (BIG aerospace companies like blackshire listed) are only TOO HAPPY to constantly get billions of dollars to "develop" things without particularly caring if they ever actually fly... if they get canceled, "so what", another big development contract of "the next big thing" is just around the corner... Heck even managers don't particularly care anymore-- if the project gets canceled, they just transfer over to the new program or a different program... happens all the time. It's the guys and gals down in the trenches "doing the dirty work" that get lost in the shuffle.

Basically, the entire premise behind "shuttle derived" was to preserve the shuttle workforce, with as little interruption as possible. To save NASA from the "brain drain" they suffered in the 70's after Apollo was canceled, most people actually doing something outside an office were pink-slipped, while NASA spent nearly a decade designing and shuffling papers on shuttle. Those folks who actually BUILT Apollo, who actually PREPARED it for launch, launched it, operated it, etc. were all sent packing, taking their hard-won experience with them. Toward the end of the 70's when NASA actually looked to have something to fly again in a few years and needed folks capable of actually getting it all together and to the launch pad, most of those folks that had been blown off years before told NASA to go pound sand, rather than uproot themselves from their new careers to run back to NASA. NASA has struggled for a LONG TIME because of this experience and knowledge loss, even to the present day... and NOW, because Constellation and the shuttle retirement was handled SO BADLY, it's happened again. That ship has already sailed. Most of the workforce is gone. Most of those folks WON'T be coming back... once they have a new job elsewhere, there won't be much incentive to 'drop everything' and run back to NASA, who blew them off and canned them because of a lack of planning.

At this point, there is basically NO reason to go "shuttle derived" anymore. We'd actually come out MUCH better with a clean sheet design of a new vehicle rougly paralleling the Saturn V-- kerosene first stage, LH2 upper stage(s), no SRB's (perhaps LRB's if they share alot of common components and such). We can use things like the SSME and ET, but we need to do it where it makes sense. The "sunk cost fallacy" and ATK's powerful lobby (and convincing Congress and DOD that solid propellant prices will skyrocket unless NASA is forced to continue using large segmented SRB's, which even the DOD has abandoned a decade or more ago with their adoption of the common core principle of the EELV's (which really highlights the way for future launch vehicle designs IMHO-- not clinging to horrifically expensive, outdated, and ultimately design and performance limiting SRB's). Something like an enlarged version of a Delta IV Heavy, using shuttle ET sized cores powered by clusters of RS-68's (assuming they were manrated) as a cargo launcher, using a common upper stage in a single-stick configuration for a crew launcher, makes MUCH more sense now than shuttle-derived SLS does... Doing a kerosene engine and making it an enlarged version of Altas V probably makes even better sense... The ultimate is probably the melding of the two ideas, shuttle derived with EELV derived, to make an "American Energia/Vulkan" using an ET based core powered by SSME's, lifted by kerosene burning LRB's (basically Atlas V cores) with the number of boosters determined by the mission mass needing to be lifted (dial-a-rocket). Up to 8 boosters clustered around an ET based SSME powered core could lift well over 130 tonnes to orbit with NO UPPER STAGE AT ALL! (Adding an upper stage means a LOT MORE could be lifted!) This idea is called the "AJAX" but it gets zero traction because it doesn't serve the political purposes like the SRB's do.

Personally, I think NASA should be broken up into various new agencies. One agency (probably headed by JPL) would run the robotic space exploration program. Another agency (probably headed by JSC) should run the manned space program, in cooperation with KSC and MSFC. A third agency should handle the aeronautics part of NASA, probably run by Glenn Research Center. GSFC, Ames, Stennis, Langley, and Dryden would be farmed out as subcenters to their respective parent centers, depending on their areas of expertise (and where they overlapped, they'd fall into one or the other and be paid by the other agency for whatever work they would happen to do for that agency-- IE, say flight testing of manned spacecraft components done at Dryden (a primarily aeronautic research center, which would fall under Glenn's direction as a primarily aeronautical center under the aeronautics agency, would be paid by JSC for that testing for their manned spacecraft parts (parachute tests or whatever) done at Dryden. (just as a for-instance).

This would simplify the budgeting process, making it more transparent, and eliminating a lot of the crap that goes on where NASA raids the budget on some projects (usually unmanned scientific projects and research) to pay for programs that have busted their budgets or schedules or both... (usually manned projects). The various centers are already "independent fiefdoms" and tend to "do their own thing" behind HQ's back anyway, and there are TONS of duplication of work and other wastefulness and a pervasive sense of "not invented here" that keeps good ideas from cross-pollinating at NASA from one area or center to another because of center rivalries or contests over who gets to be "lead center" or gets the lion's share of a particular program or part thereof anyway... If NASA is going to be so divisive and undercutting itself within it's own ranks between centers, it might as well be divided up. At least then the divisions of labor and resources would come "from on high" and not be twisted around at HQ or the various centers depending on their own whims, and the raiding of equally important projects in other areas (like robotic exploration and research) would stop, since it would make it virtually impossible to raid such funds from a completely different agency than it is currently to raid from a different division of the same agency.

NASA has too many "civil servants" on the payroll as well. Most if not all the layoffs that have resulted from the shuttle retirement and Constellation cancellation has been in the contractors-- IE the folks actually doing something. NASA hasn't designed and built a launch system in over 30 years, and their attempts at it are an unmitigated disaster-- unbelievably expensive, YEARS over schedule, and BILLIONS overbudget. NASA should be forced to do what the Air Force and other services do when they need a new ship, plane, tank, missile, etc... compete it out, downselect the most promising designs to be developed as prototypes, then select a winner and procure the product from the contractor. The military issues requirements for the system, BUT, the CONTRACTORS decide how best to meet those requirements! They draw up their designs and plans and submit it for review, and the military can select it or reject it based on merit (and of course the usual political and influence graft that inevitably find their way into ANYTHING related to the government) and price. Most of the guys who left NASA when they were canned after Apollo went to the contractors and worked on various other systems, and they and their their proteges have been the ones developing launchers since that time... NASA's designs for the Ares I upper stage and Ares V EDS upper stage were positively primitive... yet they wouldn't listen to ANYONE in industry (like Bernard Kutter) who've been designing high-performance minimum-weight upper stages for boosters for the past 30 years trying to teach them how to 'do it right'.

It's a mess... Later! OL JR :)

[blackshire]

A REAL mission with REAL timelines would be a good start, but there's A LOT more to it than that...
-SNIP-If we could just get a photograph of the NASA Administrator and the Attorney General walking out of a hotel naked with a billy goat between them, we could solve two problems at once--getting *you* to be the new NASA Administrator, and getting a new AG as part of the bargain ("Gentlemen, you wouldn't want that photo spread around, now would you? If you'll be so kind as to do two little favors, it won't..."). :-)

[Jerry Irvine]

As with anything with a largely political element, talking about or around something is not the same as talking to something or entirely about courses of actions to solve specific problems already ranked by need.

Politics revels in inefficiency and redistribution as a jobs program for their buddies and extreme bureaucracy to keep a large group of GS workers on-board.

There is also a cronnie capitalism system to favor specific vendors, some on the guise of preserving a capital base, which is code for productivity does not matter.

The only long term solution is to privatize the endeavor entirely and if you still want to contribute public funds to that fine, but it will not be managed under any of the same incentives and will particularly escape "sovereign immunity" which is a false legal precedent since in this country the sovereign is the individual citizen, not the government, even by delegation, and not even "groups" of citizens. Individuals. So any time individuals are harmed under the theory of "sovereign immunity" that is actually an act of treason. The fact it has not been reduced to federal law, regulations or state law notwithstanding.

Common law prevails over all else. One has to persue it.

Jerry

[luke strawwalker]

If we could just get a photograph of the NASA Administrator and the Attorney General walking out of a hotel naked with a billy goat between them, we could solve two problems at once--getting *you* to be the new NASA Administrator, and getting a new AG as part of the bargain ("Gentlemen, you wouldn't want that photo spread around, now would you? If you'll be so kind as to do two little favors, it won't..."). :-)


HA! You've been in the clover or locoweed again, haven't you?? :chuckle: :p

Later! OL JR :)

[Jerry Irvine]

I saw the current NASA administrator on C-SPAN and he couldn't pronounce many of the words he was reading dryly and he had minimal subject understanding during Q&A. He is clearly a budget guy.

Let's keep this simple. Build more Saturn V's. Backup plan SLS. Keep Matt busy.

Jerry

[blackshire]

HA! You've been in the clover or locoweed again, haven't you?? :chuckle: :p

Later! OL JR :)No--that happened before I decided to come here in this form. :-)

[blackshire]

I saw the current NASA administrator on C-SPAN and he couldn't pronounce many of the words he was reading dryly and he had minimal subject understanding during Q&A. He is clearly a budget guy.

Let's keep this simple. Build more Saturn V's. Backup plan SLS. Keep Matt busy.

JerryI'm not surprised. The post of NASA Administrator has sometimes been treated as a "sop" job (a sinecure) that Presidents have designated for friends who helped them get elected. I agree: "Keep Matt busy," and maybe the engineers (if given freer rein) will come up with more sensible projects.

[luke strawwalker]

I saw the current NASA administrator on C-SPAN and he couldn't pronounce many of the words he was reading dryly and he had minimal subject understanding during Q&A. He is clearly a budget guy.

Let's keep this simple. Build more Saturn V's. Backup plan SLS. Keep Matt busy.

Jerry

Charlie Bolden is a Marine General (IIRC his rank) and former shuttle astronaut, most famously from the mission that originally deployed Hubble back in the 90's.

He didn't REALLY want the job of NASA Administrator, but Congress rejected Obama's first choice (Lori Garver, who is now Deputy Administrator and basically, for all intents and purposes, running NASA), and Obama convinced him to accept the nomination for Administrator, since he'd already felt out Congress to see who they WOULD approve, and Bolden was on that list. Lori Garver has been a space policy wonk in various organizations and such before leading one of Obama's "teams" that "looked under the hood at NASA" before/during the time Obama took office (transition teams). Mike Griffin, the former Administrator, appointed by Bush II to replace Sean O'Keefe, and chief proponent of Constellation and Ares I/V, had squandered any confidence he held outside NASA (and hear tell inside NASA too) due to the mismanagement and problems with Constellation that took place on his watch.

Charlie Bolden has made any number of flubs and public screw ups... he's not a particularly good public speaker and while I'm sure he's a highly intelligent person, his gaffs and flubs make him look rather forgetful or senile or something... He disappeared from public view after a series of rather obvious flubs relating to the whole "NASA must reach out to the Muslims" bit that was OBVIOUSLY foisted on him by some of Obama's hacks further up the food chain, and Charlie's mishandling of it... Basically, from what I can see, he's become basically a mouthpiece for the Obama Administration and its policies (or lack thereof) for NASA and is basically relegated to the role and prominence of a cheerleader... nothing much more or less.

Garver and John Holdren, Obama's science advisor, are unapologetic supporters of "commercial space access" and want to steer NASA in that direction, but "institutional resistance" from within NASA itself and from Congress, which wants NASA in the launcher designing and building business so that money will continue to flow into the "right" Congressional districts, is frustrating their efforts in this regard. Obama's position agrees with Garver and Holdren (and Bolden for that matter since he's basically just a cheerleader from what one can see) and so basically they've got a standoff between Congress and NASA institutions and contractors on the one side (supporting HLV's and "shuttle derived" even though that boat has pretty much sailed by now and does more so with each passing day), and the Administration and NASA HQ on the other (who support downsizing NASA and turning most stuff over to the commercial companies to provide NASA with "contracted services" like launching astronauts and such... Obama may make vague speeches in regards to Mars and "touching asteroids" but he full well knows that the timetables for such things are SO far in the future that he himself will be eligible for Social Security before it would come to pass, so it's lipservice only... his ACTIONS show that he basically wants NASA to buy commercial launcher seats to ISS and that's it... but he's not going to make an issue of it politically... he managed to get Constellation's "return to the Moon" canceled and doesn't particularly care if ANYTHING takes it's place, hence the dilly-dallying on SLS until basically the entire shuttle workforce (that was the primary motivating factor for choosing "shuttle derived" in the first place) was laid off and gone... Congress came up with the "SLS plan" to replace Constellation (and its all-important shuttle contractors in the "right" Congressional districts) and Obama's not going to fight tooth and nail even though he doesn't want it... he cons everybody by putting "more money" in the budget for NASA that he KNOWS Congress is NOT going to appropriate, because NASA HQ under Bolden and Garver are feet dragging and obfuscating on SLS as much as is humanly possible, and Congress will NOT support Obama's chosen path (commercial), so he's basically playing both sides against the middle... good old fashioned Chicago politics...)

Which is why we're in the quandary that we're in, and NOTHING substantial is getting done or looks to get done for the foreseeable future... it's all gridlocked in a subtle power-struggle and the next election may well prove which side ultimately wins. In the meantime, NOBODY wins...

Later! OL JR :)

[luke strawwalker]

I'm not surprised. The post of NASA Administrator has sometimes been treated as a "sop" job (a sinecure) that Presidents have designated for friends who helped them get elected. I agree: "Keep Matt busy," and maybe the engineers (if given freer rein) will come up with more sensible projects.

No, no, no...

Big segmented SRB's are part of the PROBLEM, NOT part of the solution...

They are HUGELY expensive and EXTREMELY limiting to the launcher capabilities due to the limits of the infrastructure at KSC...

NOBODY else uses them, not even the DOD, which is touted as the main reason NASA *must* keep using them (to keep the capability and skillset in place to produce large SRM's for national defense, and keep procurement prices down for DOD... a rediculous case of reverse logic if ever I heard one! DOD is the one with "bottomless pockets" and yet NASA is being *forced* to cling to a large segmented SRB-based launch system purely for the reason of keeping prices down for DOD on missile propellant and the skillset intact for some future replacement ICBM project that will never happen?? That's like charging me $45,000 for a Yugo so you can get a $5,000 discount on a new high end Mercedes... it doesn't make sense!) Heck, even DOD dumped the big segmented SRM's when they went with the common core design for the EELV's... they KNEW that the SRM's would add another procurement line, support infrastructure, and storage/handling/integration chain to the program over using multiple liquid-fuelled cores and/or small SRM's for big launches, which is why Titan IV was SO expensive (on par with shuttle). Getting the cost down was a MAJOR motivator for the EELV program (along with the dwindling supply of Titan cores) BUT DOD COULD have "required" the use of large segmented SRM's with the prospective EELV candidates for the "heavy" launchers as a condition of the competition... but they DIDN'T because they KNEW it'd be more expensive and wasn't worth the cost and trouble... NOW they *demand* NASA keep using large segmented SRB's although NOBODY else uses them, therefore there is NO cost-sharing between programs, keeping the prices for them high. It's senseless...

ATK got a billion dollar contract to upgrade the four-segment shuttle SRB's into five-segment SRM's for the Ares I first stage. Now they're getting even more money to adapt them into SRB's again for SLS. There are only SO many shuttle SRB casings remaining and they haven't been produced in many years... and recreating the production capability and ordering more sets would be a VERY expensive proposition in its own right... The Ares I test flight damaged the SRB casing beyond repair, and this was an issue all along-- the bigger SRB is 20% heavier (roughly) and travelling much higher and faster than the shuttle's four segment SRB's did, complicating recovery to the point that it was going to become VERY dicey to get the SRB's back intact anyway. NOW the plan is that the "existing" (or "nearly existing") five-segment shuttle-casing based SRB's only be used for the first few test flights of the SLS rocket... and that the casings will NOT be recovered... (recovery and refurbishment costs, inspection, shipping to Utah for propellant refilling, then shipping back to KSC for storage, testing, integration, and launch, proved more expensive at the existing shuttle flightrates than merely using expendable spiral-filament wound casings would have cost... (like Ariane V uses). Had the shuttle EVER gotten up over about 30 launches a year or so, the reusable SRB's would be cheaper than disposables). SO, once the final existing flight sets of SRB's are "flown out" and sunk on the bottom of the Atlantic, some other new booster will be required.

Now, SUPPOSEDLY that new booster is going to be competed out between LRB's and new high-pressure SRB's. Since the LRB's will have to "plug into" the SLS stack as a 'direct drop in' where the SRB's were once located, supporting the SLS core on the pad as the shuttle boosters supported the ET and Orbiter on the pad, from the top, and have definite load path and size requirements that they'll have to fit in, as well as matching or surpassing the thrust levels of SRB's (the only thing they REALLY shine at, despite the LOW ISP). I personally think the LRB is more of a 'sideshow', a bone thrown to keep the LRB supporters at bay while conviently positioning ATK to get a big fat development contract for the new high-pressure steel-lined filament-overwound disposable SRB's they want to develop as an "improvement" for SLS... and given their lobbying power and cronyism on Capitol Hill, they'll probably get it.

BUT, NONE of this contributes ONE THING to greater affordability, sustainability, or performance for the space program... just greater expense for the US taxpayer footing the bill for it all...

With all due respect to Matt and best wishes for his success, personally I hope he sells a lot more HPR rocket goodies than the company he works for sells large segmented SRB's...

Later! OL JR :)

[blackshire]

No, no, no...

Big segmented SRB's are part of the PROBLEM, NOT part of the solution...That's not what I meant (I didn't know it was *that* Matt [not casting any aspersions on him as a person]). I know NASA engineers who never liked the Shuttle as it came to be built (they preferred some of the various earlier, modest-size versions), and I was referring to giving engineers such as them (*not* the Shuttle/SLS cheerleaders) freer rein to develop a follow-on system. As far as ATK and their SRB cases are concerned, a leaky roof in their storage building that would facilitate the motor cases rusting too much to be flightworthy would be a good thing!

[Jerry Irvine]

the new high-pressure steel-lined filament-overwound disposable SRB's they want to develop as an "improvement" for SLS...In stock now:

Just Jerry

[luke strawwalker]

At one point big hybrids were being looked at for shuttle, IIRC... I know I've seen proposals for them (somewhere along the line). At least hybrids have the capability of being shut down, unlike solids...

The weight and it's impact on the vehicle size (capability) without busting the limits of the infrastructure is the biggest problem with either, though... plus the fact that NOTHING else would share the costs and the development is expensive...

Liquids are still expensive to develop, to be sure, and CAN be expensive if you do it in a stupid way that doesn't share costs with any other programs or vehicles... BUT they bring a lot of extra performance and safety to the table, and really blow the lid off the capabilities upgrades you can do to the vehicle system before you start smashing into infrastructure limits...

Later! OL JR :)

[blackshire]

Yes, the MCD (Minimum Cost Design) criteria and MCD proof-of-concept hardware (that Boeing and TRW built, including a 250,000 lb thrust RP-1/LOX pressure-fed engine) all indicate that large, thick-walled pressure-fed boosters and first stages would be cheap and reliable, and they could even be recovered and reused if desired.